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Abstract 
Industrial production and liquidity in China and liquidity in other major countries are introduced into 
the Kilian (2009) model identifying the supply and demand side factors driving real oil price 
changes. It is recognized that China’s real liquidity may proxy for real income increase in China. 
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persist. Positive innovations to G3 liquidity raise real oil price by much smaller amounts before 
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industrial commodities during 2010. Global demand for industrial commodities reacts positively to 
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Crude Oil Prices: China’s Influence Over 1996-2011 
1.Introduction 
The importance of oil price shocks for the functioning of the real economy is well attested. 
Hamilton’s (1983) seminal work connecting oil price shocks with recession and economic slowdown 
in the U.S. has been substantiated and further investigated by Mork, (1989), Lee et al. (1995), 
Hooker (1996), Hamilton (1996; 2003), Gronwald (2008) and Kilian (2008a; 2009) for the U.S., and 
by Cologni and Manera (2009), Kilian (2008b), Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) and Cunado 
and Perez de Garcia (2005) for other countries.
1
 In recent years the significance of real oil prices for 
real activity and the high levels real high prices have attained has led to increased interest on the 
determinants of movement in real oil price. 
Oil demand from emerging market countries is identified as the most important factor 
influencing oil prices in recent years and is likely to remain so in future decades. Hamilton (2011) 
identifies 1997-2010 as a “new industrial age” characterized by billions of people making the 
transition from agricultural to industrial activity with increases in real income beyond subsistence 
levels. The newly industrialized economies have absorbed over two-thirds of the increase in world 
oil consumption since 1998. China has a 6.3% compound annual growth rate for petroleum 
consumption since 1998 (Hamilton; 2011).
2
 Real oil price increases are connected with surprisingly 
strong growth forecasts in emerging economies over 2003-2008 and the decline in real oil prices 
after mid 2008 are predicted by the forecasts of decline in global growth (Kilian and Hicks; 2012).  
This paper introduces the influence of industrial production and liquidity in China and 
liquidity in developed economies for changes in real oil price, building on the framework of Kilian 
(2009) which identifies the supply and demand side factors driving oil prices. The analysis sheds 
                                                          
1
 Reviews of the literature on the effect of oil shocks on the aggregate economy are provided by Hamilton (2008), Kilian 
(2008c), Huntington (2005), Barsky and Kilian (2004) and Jones et al. (2004). 
2
 Hamilton (2011) provides a review of the oil industry and analyses events influencing oil price. Hamilton (2009) shows 
that the oil price increases during 2007 and 2008 were due to strong global demand for oil. He argues that the oil price 
increases tipped the U.S. into recession during 2007:Q4 to 2008:Q3. Mu and Ye (2011) do not find that China as a net oil 
importer has a significant effect on monthly oil price changes based on a three variable (global oil production, China’s 
net oil imports and oil price) VAR analysis.  
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light on the causes of movement in oil prices over the last twenty five years and in assessing the 
relative importance of China in the upsurge of the real price of crude oil. China’s industrial 
production is highly correlated with Kilian’s (2009) measure of global demand for industrial 
commodities (as reflected by shipping prices). A positive shock to global demand for commodities 
has a statistically significant effect on real oil prices that peaks after 4 months before gradually 
eroding. China’s industrial production does not have a significant impact on real oil prices when the 
influence of global demand for industrial commodities on real oil price is recognized. Positive 
innovations to U.S., Japanese and Eurozone liquidity raise real oil price for several months and then 
the effect erodes. In contrast, unanticipated increases in China’s liquidity cause much larger 
increases in real oil prices within three months that then persist.  
Following a sharp fall in the last half of 2008 connected with the Global Financial Crisis, real 
oil price rose strongly over 2009-2010. This rise is associated with shocks from China’s liquidity 
(especially during 2009) and global demand for all industrial commodities (especially during 2010). 
The cumulative impact of developed country liquidity shocks on real oil prices is small compared to 
the cumulative effect of China’s liquidity on the real price of crude oil over 2009-2010. These effects 
hold when controlling for global demand for industrial commodities and growth in China’s industrial 
production.  
Over 1996:1-2011:12 global oil production increases with positive shocks to global demand 
for industrial commodities, growth in China’s industrial production, real oil price, developed 
countries’ liquidity and China’s liquidity. A positive shock to China’s industrial production is 
associated with a significant and continuing increase in global oil production, even allowing for the 
role of global demand for commodities in influencing production. An unanticipated increase in 
China’s liquidity causes a significant and persistent increase in global oil production that is larger 
and longer lasting than the response in global oil production to unanticipated increases in developed 
countries’ liquidity. Global demand for industrial commodities reacts positively to China’s industrial 
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production. In juxtaposition to the effects on global oil production and real oil price, the effect of 
unanticipated increases in developed countries’ liquidity on global demand for industrial 
commodities is at least as large as the effect of unanticipated increases in China’s liquidity on global 
demand for industrial commodities.   
Background information on China’s M2 and industrial production and the M2 of other major 
countries is examined in Section 2. The structural vector autoregressive model for analysis of real 
crude oil prices is discussed in Section 3. The empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. China’s M2, industrial production, Global M2 and oil price 
The growing importance of China’s money supply for global liquidity is illustrated in Figure 
1. In Figure 1a the M2 money supplies in billions of U.S. dollars (USD) for China, U.S., Eurozone, 
Japan, the U.K. and Switzerland over 1996:01-2011:12 are presented. In Figure 1b the global M2 in 
billions of USD is shown. Global M2 is taken to be the sum of the M2 in China and in the G3. 
Throughout the paper we take the G3 to be the U.S., Eurozone and Japan.  The rise of China’s 
money supply as share of global money supply has been marked. In 1996 China’s M2 measured in 
USD only account for less than 5% of global M2, however by 2011 this share increased to 28%. For 
this reason, the upward trend in global M2 in Figure 1b is due to the behaviour of China’s M2. 
Chinese M2 growth rate has driven global M2 growth since at least 2000. The behaviour of China’s 
nominal GDP is similar to that of China’s nominal M2 and is strongly upward. This pattern is 
illustrated in Figure 1c. From 1996 to 2011 China’s nominal GDP (in USD) increased on average by 
15% per year and M2 (in USD) increased on average by 19.5% per year.  
Since monthly data on GDP is not available we use China’s industrial production as a 
measure of aggregate activity in China. In Figure 1d Kilian’s (2009) measure of global demand for 
industrial commodities is shown with the log in China’s index of industrial production (CIP). The 
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two series are closely aligned. The collapse in shipping prices with the onset of the global financial 
crisis at the end 2008 coincides with a sharp fall in China’s industrial production. A granger causality 
test confirms that Chinese industrial production Granger causes global demand for industrial 
commodities while the reverse does not hold.  
The real oil price and G3 real M2 and China real M2 are shown in Figure 1e. In Figure 1e 
China’s M2 is strongly upward and the G3 M2 is much flatter. Nominal China’s M2 trends much 
closer to oil prices than the G3 M2. Given these facts we believe that credible hypotheses are that 
China’s expansive aggregate activity and growing liquidity are in part responsible for higher oil 
prices. We should be careful though to conclude an entirely monetary thesis to the influence of 
China’s liquidity on oil price. 
Barsky and Kilian (2004) argue that change in monetary policy regimes was a key factor 
behind the oil price increases of the 1970s and the subsequent stagflation in many major economies. 
U.S. inflation can raise the nominal oil price which is quoted in USD. Barsky and Kilian (2004) 
show that the substantial increase in industrial commodity prices that preceded the increase in oil 
prices in 1973-1974 is consistent with the view that rising demand based on increased global 
liquidity (measured by money growth in ten industrial economies) drove oil prices higher. Alquist et 
al. (2011) also discuss this thesis and confirm the Gillman and Nakov (2009) findings that monetary 
factors Granger cause oil prices in the post-war period up until 1997. Gillman and Nakov (2009) 
speculate that Chinese real demand caused the real price of oil to increase at that point onwards. 
Alquist et al. (2011) and Gillman and Nakov (2009) address how the spike in inflation led to the 
spike in nominal oil prices to catch up on years of past inflation once the Bretton Woods fixed 
exchange rate system broke down.  
Nothing in China’s activity suggests an increase in worldwide inflation as during the 1970s. 
China’s Real M2 (the variable that drives real oil price in this paper) is different from nominal M2 
and may reflect credit expansion in China that led to increased inflation in China, but not to an 
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increase in world inflation. It is likely the real oil price rise is due to real income increase in China 
and real M2 is a good proxy of that.
3
 If not real factors driving the real oil price, then the WTI price 
should have moved closely in line with world inflation without a trend upwards in the real price of 
oil. 
 
3. Methodology 
We use the decomposition of oil price movements into structural shocks due to Kilian (2009). 
In Kilian (2009), changes in the real price of crude oil are decomposed as arising from global oil 
production shocks, shocks to global demand for industrial commodities and a residual, oil market-
specific demand shocks. The latter is associated with precautionary demand shocks specific to the 
crude oil market due to worries about future oil supplies.  
In this paper we introduce China’s industrial production and liquidity into the model. If 
liquidity is only a veil over real values, then real M2 in the G3 and in China will not significantly 
influence the real price of oil.  A structural VAR model (SVAR) is expressed in matrix form as (for 
simplicity the constant term is omitted): 
 0 1 ,
j
t i t i ti
B X B X           (1) 
where j  is the optimal lag length, determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), tX  is 
vector of endogenous variables, and t  is the vector of structural changes, which is serially and 
mutually independent.  
The endogenous variables in the model are: 
[ , , , , 3 2 , 2 ],t t t t t t tX GO AD CIP RP G M CM      (2) 
                                                          
3
 Real M2 may act as a good proxy for real income in China. The GDP data are not available monthly and are not 
reliable. Industrial production only partly reflects real income. Real money demand typically has unitary income 
elasticity, and so real money rises proportionately with real income. The substitution effect of fluctuating nominal 
interest rates also effects money demand but income is the main determinant. 
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where tGO  is percentage change in global oil production, tAD  is global demand for commodities 
(from Kilian (2009)), tCIP  is the log difference in China’s index of industrial production, tRP  is 
percentage change in the real price of oil, the nominal price of oil deflated by the U.S. consumer 
price index (CPI), 3 2tG M  is percentage change in G3 M2 in USD deflated by the CPI, and 
2tCM  is 
percentage change in China’s M2 in USD deflated by the U.S. CPI.  
To identify the model restrictions are imposed in the      as follows: 
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Model restrictions reflect those in Kilian (2009), while respecting the addition of CIP and 
liquidity in our model. Restrictions are only imposed in the contemporaneous matrix. These 
restrictions are placed using Cholesky decomposition lower triangle matrix shown in equation (3) 
and are motivated as follows.
4
 Shocks to oil production are assumed to not respond to the other 
structural shocks. Oil production only depends on lags of the other variables since it will take some 
time to alter oil production in response to the other shocks. Oil production is unlikely to respond to 
the other shocks within the same month.  
The global demand for commodities indicator responds contemporaneously to oil production 
shocks, because the world demand for industrial commodities could be affected immediately by, for 
example, an oil production shortage. However, this indicator is expected to respond with some delay 
to monetary variables, Chinese industrial production and oil prices. China’s industrial production is 
placed third in the structural VAR. China’s industrial production depends contemporaneously on 
global demand for commodities which is also thought of as a proxy for global aggregate demand. 
China’s industrial production is assumed to not respond to real oil price or money supply shocks in 
                                                          
4
 For more detail about the Cholesky decomposition see Hamilton (1994; page 87).  
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the same month. Innovations to the real price of oil not explained by shocks to oil production, global 
demand for commodities and China’s industrial production will reflect changes in the sector specific 
demand for oil as opposed to changes in the demand for all industrial commodities. 
In system (3), shocks to real money supply in the G3 and in China will not influence oil 
supply, global demand for commodities, China’s industrial production and the real price of oil in the 
same month. We assume that China’s M2 depends contemporaneously on G3 M2. China’s M2 is 
substantially smaller than G3 M2 over most of the sample and China’s lenders and monetary 
authorities are more likely to see (at least in partial data release) contemporaneously global monetary 
movements (than the opposite).   
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information Criterion (BIC) are 
used for selection of optimal lag length. We choose the most parsimonious specification for reasons 
of efficiency.
5
 The AIC selected three lags and the BIC selected two lags. Results are not affected by 
a longer lag selection. To test for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, the residual serial 
correlation LM test and the VAR residual heteroskedasticity test are carried out. The null hypothesis 
of both, no serial correlation and no heteroskedasticity of the joint combinations of all error term 
products cannot be rejected at the 5% level (respectively). An important condition to be satisfied in 
any VAR model is that the lag structure included also has to be stationary. The inverse roots of AR 
characteristic polynomial test shows that no root lies outside the unit circle, supporting the 
conclusion that our models have stable roots.  
 
4. Data and variables 
 Data are monthly data from February 1996 to December 2011 since the M2 series for 
China is only available from January 1996. This starting date also coincides with Hamilton’s (2011) 
structural break analysis. The real oil price is the change in the log of the spot price of Western Texas 
                                                          
5
 In the literature on oil price shocks selection of a shorter lag for efficiency is quite common. For example, see Park and 
Ratti (2008) and Sadorsky (2012).  
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Intermediate (WTI) oil divided by the U.S. CPI. Following Kilian (2009), global oil production is an 
endogenous variable.
6
 The spot price of WTI and global oil production are obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Energy. Global demand for commodities is given by Kilian’s (2009) global index of 
dry cargo single voyage freight rates. Some advantages of this measure are that it is available at a 
monthly frequency in contrast to real GDP which is only available quarterly and it reflects global 
demand for commodities rather demand within one particular country. A monthly interpolated 
version of global GDP is also used in our robustness analysis.  
G3 M2 is constructed by aggregating M2 in USD for the 3 largest economies, the United 
States, the Eurozone and Japan. M2 in each of the G3 is far larger than M2 in any other country over 
1996-2011 with the exception of China in recent years. China’s M2 is in USD. Use of M2 as 
measure of liquidity is based on the following observations. First, M2 is the only measure of China’s 
money supply going back to 1996. Second, M2 is reported in domestic currency and upon 
conversion to USD is easily aggregated into a global liquidity indicator (without raising issues about 
appropriate weights over time that arise in constructing a global liquidity indicator based on interest 
rates). M2 is deflated by the U.S. CPI. Growth rates in G3 real M2 and China’s real M2 appear in the 
model. Data on M2 are obtained from International Financial Statistics (IMF).  
The assumption of the VAR model requires that all variables in the model must be stationary, 
or that the linear combinations of non-stationary but co-integrated variables must be stationary.
7
 The 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test reveals that the logarithm of oil production, logarithm 
of China’s industrial production index, G3 M2, China’s M2 and oil prices are only first difference 
stationary. The p-values for the null hypothesis of having a unit root are: 0.44, 0.18, 0.98, 0.99 and 
0.77 respectively. The Phillip-Perron (PP) and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests 
also suggest use of log first differences. The null hypothesis of unit root in the real price of oil cannot 
                                                          
6
 Global oil production may with time respond to the other variables in the VAR as well as to geopolitical events. For 
example, Kilian (2008a) and Hamilton (2009) identify unrest in Venezuela over December 2002 and January 2003 and 
the second Persian Gulf War over February and March 2003 as disruptive for oil production. 
7
 This is not strictly true, the original VARs of Sims were agnostic and wanted the data to decide. This still works if there 
is sufficient lag structure. 
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be rejected at 76% for monthly data over 1996:01-2011:12. Kilian’s (2009) indicator of global 
demand for commodities is an index already constructed to be stationary. (It is a business cycle 
index). Consequently, we take log first differences of the variables oil production, China’s industrial 
production index, G3M2, CM2 and oil prices. 
 
5. Results  
5.1. The impulse response effects of the structural shocks  
Figure 2 shows the responses of the variables in the SVAR to one-standard deviation 
structural innovations. The dashed lines represent one and two standard error confidence bands 
around the estimates of the coefficients of the impulse response functions.
8
 The first column shows 
the responses of global oil production, global demand for commodities, China’s industrial 
production, the real price of oil, G3 real M2 and China’s real M2 to a structural innovation in global 
oil production. A supply disruption significantly reduces the production of oil that is only partly 
offset in the first three months. The effect of an unanticipated supply disruption on global oil 
production is very persistent and highly significant.  An unanticipated negative innovation in global 
oil production significantly reduces global demand for commodities and G3 real M2 for an extended 
period, but does not have significant effects on China’s industrial production and China’s real M2. 
In the second column of Figure 2 a positive shock to global demand for commodities has a 
persistent positive effect on global oil production that builds up over a 4 to 6 month window before 
levelling off. The effect is statistically significant for 14 months. A positive shock to global demand 
for commodities has a statistically significant effect (for 9 months) on real oil prices that peaks after 
4 months before gradually eroding.
9
 An unanticipated global demand for commodities expansion has 
                                                          
8
 The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described by Sims (1980), where 5000 draws were 
used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient. 
9
 This result is different from the finding by Kilian (2009) for 1973:1-2007:12 in that a positive shock to aggregate 
demand for all industrial commodities resulted in a significant oil price increase that builds up over the first year and then 
is sustained at a large value. The finding that aggregate demand for all industrial commodities has a lesser effect over 
1996:1-2011:12 is not due to the inclusion of M2 variables in the SVAR. For a 3 variable SVAR along the lines of 
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a very persistent and highly significant effect on global demand for commodities that rises over time. 
Shocks to global demand for commodities do not significantly affect China’s industrial production. A 
positive shock to global demand for commodities has positive and increasing effect on China’s real 
M2.  
The third column shows the effects of a shock to China’s industrial production. A positive 
shock to China’s industrial production is associated with significant increases on global oil 
production and global demand for commodities, and insignificant effects on real oil price, G3 real 
M2 and China’s real M2. The effects of an oil market–specific demand shock are shown in column 4 
of Figure 3. A positive in oil market-specific demand shock has a large and persistent positive effect 
on the real price of oil (in fourth row). This effect is highly statistically significant and rises in 
magnitude over the first three months and then persists. An oil market–specific demand shock is 
associated with significant positive effects on global oil production, global demand for commodities 
and China’s industrial production. A positive oil market–specific demand shock is linked with 
declines in G3 real M2 and significant declines in China’s real M2.10 
In the sixth (fifth) column are shown the responses of global oil production, global demand 
for commodities, China’s industrial production, real price of oil, G3 real M2 and China’s real M2 to 
a structural innovation in China’s (G3) real M2. In response to an unanticipated increase in China’s 
real M2, there are significant and persistent increases in global oil production, global demand for 
commodities and in real oil prices. G3 real M2 and China’s industrial production (except for a one 
month negative effect) are not significantly affected by innovations to China’s real M2.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Kilian’s (2009) model estimated over 1996:1-2011:12 results in a significant effect of a positive shock to aggregate 
demand for all industrial commodities on real oil price only over the first three months (after which the effect gradually 
erodes). 
10
 These findings of monetary contraction are consistent with those by Kilian and Lewis (2011) that in response to 
positive innovations in oil market-specific demand there are significant and sustained increase in the federal funds rate 
Kilian and Lewis (2011) obtain these findings by adding the federal funds rate as a fourth variable to a Kilian (2009) 
SVAR model for the sample period is 1973.2–2008.6. Kilian and Lewis (2011) find that in response to oil supply 
disruption is a reduction in the federal funds rate. Fan et al. (2011) observe that the central bank of China maintains that 
the money supply is the main monetary tool in China, a view confirmed by the analysis in their paper. 
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In contrast to the effect of innovations in China’s real M2, an unanticipated increase in G3 
real M2 has a positive effect on China’s industrial production that is statistically significant at the 
10% level for eighteen months (and at the 5% level between the fifth and eighth month). 
Unanticipated increase in G3 real M2 has much smaller effects than shocks China’s real M2 on 
global oil production and in real oil prices. G3 real M2 has a positive effect on global oil production 
that is statistically significant at the 10% level after 6 months and a positive effect on real oil price 
that is statistically significant at the 10% level between the fourth and tenth months, but the effects 
are relatively small.  G3 real M2 has a statistically significant relatively large growing positive effect 
on global demand for commodities. 
These results underline the fact that for effects on real oil prices it matters where the 
innovation in money is originating. Over 1996:01-2011:12 an innovation in China’s real M2 has 
significant effects on real oil price whereas an innovation in real M2 in the G3 has smaller and less 
significant effects on real oil price. This result is robust to changes in model specification. The Kilian 
(2009) measure of global demand for commodities is narrower than a global GDP measure of real 
activity. As an alternative specification of global real activity we convert quarterly GDP for the 
largest four economies, the U.S., Eurozone, China and Japan into monthly GDP by interpolation of 
the quarterly data.
11
 These economies account for around 65% of global GDP in the period studied. 
We substitute the interpolated real GDP of the four largest economies for Kilian’s measure of global 
real activity and find (in results not reported) that over 1996:01-2011:12 positive surprises in China’s 
real M2 have larger, longer lasting and more significant effects on real oil price than positive 
surprises in real M2 in the G3. Removal of China’s industrial production from the SVAR system, so 
that only liquidity affects appear in the SVAR also does not modify the result that the effects on real 
oil price of innovations to China’s real M2 dominate those of innovations to G3 real M2.   
                                                          
11
 Global GDP is not available on a quarterly basis, but that for the four largest economies is available at a quarterly 
frequency. Miller and Ni (2011) obtained annual global GDP data from Angus Maddison’s historical statistics [Maddison 
(2010)] for 1971–2008 and used quarterly OECD GDP to interpolate global GDP at a quarterly frequency. The global 
GDP series only exist in annual frequency. However, the aggregation of the four largest economies can be obtained 
quarterly improving significantly the number of original observations in the interpolating procedure. 
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5.2. Cumulative effect of structural shocks on real price of oil  
The cumulative contribution to the real price of oil of the structural shocks to global oil 
production, global demand for commodities, China’s industrial production, oil market-specific 
demand, G3 real M2 and China’s real M2 over 1996:01-2011:12 are reported in Figure 3. It should 
be noted that in the monthly data shown in Figure 1e, spot prices per barrel for WTI are $58.14 in 
January 2007 and $140 in June 2008, $41.68 in January 2009 and $133.93 in April 2011. 
The largest cumulative contributions to real oil price movement over time in Figure 3 are 
structural shocks to global demand for commodities and China’s real M2, and oil market-specific 
demand shocks. In Figure 3 the cumulative contribution of oil production shocks to real oil prices is 
small during 1996:01-2011:12. The cumulative contribution of China’s industrial production to real 
oil prices is also small during 1996:01-2011:12. This is because the effect China’s industrial 
production is being masked by the effect on real oil price of global demand for commodities (which 
is strongly related to China’s industrial production). 
The cumulative impact of global demand for commodities’ shocks on real oil price is large 
over 1996:01-2011:12 in Figure 3. The fall in oil price from July 2008 to February 2009 is associated 
with the global financial crisis during late 2008, recession in the U.S. over December 2007 to June 
2009, and weak growth in Europe. This is reflected in Figure 3 in that the cumulative structural 
shocks to global demand for commodities are negative at the end of 2008 and in early 2009. 
The cumulative effect of China’s real M2 on the real price of crude oil is large. The 
cumulative impact of China’s real M2 on the real price of crude oil is particularly substantial in the 
recovery of oil price during 2009 and early 2010 from a low in January 2009. The rise in oil price 
from January 2009 through April 2011 is associated with large positive structural shocks to China’s 
real M2 and positive shocks to global real aggregate demand. The cumulative impact of real G3 M2 
shocks on real oil prices in Figure 3 is relatively small. 
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The cumulative impact of oil market-specific demand shocks on real oil prices is very large 
in Figure 3. Oil market-specific demand shocks played a role in the rise in oil price from late 2007 to 
mid-2008 and in the fall in oil price up until January 2009. Oil market-specific demand shocks work 
to lower real oil price during most of 2009, a period of strongly rising oil prices. During 2009 real oil 
price is boosted by China’s real M2. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Industrial production and liquidity in China and liquidity in other major countries is 
introduced into the Kilian (2009) model identifying the supply and demand side factors driving real 
oil price changes. It is recognized that China’s Real M2 may be a good proxy for real income 
increase in China. Unanticipated increases in China’s liquidity cause large significant increases in 
real oil prices within three months that then persist. Positive innovations to U.S., Japanese and 
Eurozone liquidity raise real oil price by much smaller amounts for several months before winding 
down. 
Following a sharp fall late in 2008 real oil price rose strongly over 2009-2010. This rise is 
associated with shocks from China’s liquidity during 2009 and recovered global demand for all 
industrial commodities during 2010. China’s industrial production is highly correlated with Kilian’s 
(2009) measure of global demand for industrial commodities. Global demand for industrial 
commodities reacts positively to China’s industrial production. 
A positive shock to China’s industrial production is associated with a significant increase in 
global oil production, even allowing for the role of global demand for commodities in influencing 
production, over 1996:1-2011:12. An unanticipated increase in China’s liquidity causes a significant 
and persistent increase in global oil production that is larger and longer lasting than the response in 
global oil production to unanticipated increases in developed countries’ liquidity. The study is 
15 
 
helpful in assessing the importance of China in the upsurge of the real price of crude oil in recent 
years. 
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Figure 1a: Money supplies (M2 in billions of USD) in China, U.S., Eurozone, Japan, U.K. and 
Switzerland: 1996:01-2011:12  
 
 
Figure 1b: Global (G3 plus China) money supply (in billions of USD): 1996:01-2011:12 
 
 
Figure 1c: China’s nominal GDP and money supply (in billions of USD): 1996:01-2011:12 
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Figure 1d: Global demand for commodities (AD) vs. China’s logs in industrial production (CIP) 
(1996:1 to 2011:12) 
 
 
Figure 1e: Price of oil and G3 and China’s real money supplies indexes 1996:01-2011:12 
 
Notes: Global M2 is taken to be the sum of the M2 in China and in the G3. The G3 is taken to be the U.S., Eurozone and 
Japan. Global demand for commodities (AD) is from Kilian (2009). 
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Figure 2: The impulse response effects of the structural shocks: 1996:01-2011:12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: GO is global oil production, AD is global demand for commodities, CIP is China’s industrial production, RP is 
real oil price, G3M2 is real M2 of G3 countries, and CM2 is China’s real M2. 
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Figure 3: Cumulative effect of structural shocks on real price of oil (annual averages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: GO is global oil production, AD is global demand for commodities, IP is industrial production, RP is real oil 
price, G3M2 is real M2 of G3 countries, and CM2 is China’s real M2. 
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